True knowledge flower of religion and faith in Islam

A very important principle of ethics in Islam is that “he who has no knowledge of an action can never deliberately intend to act upon it (man la ‘ilma lahu fa-la niyyata lahu)”.

This fundamental element is stated by al-Tahanawi in his Kashshaf Istilahat al-Funun, arguably the finest dictionary of technical terms relating to Islamic sciences.

In reality, one’s action (‘amal) is only according to one’s intention (niyyah), which in turn depends on the strength of one’s knowledge pertaining to various dimensions of that action.

If one is not really certain, in the Quranic sense of yaqin, of what one ought to do, one may very likely be capricious and do what is wrong.

Such is always the case, as niyyah refers to one’s determination of mind and heart, which directs the purpose, aims and objectives in one’s journey through Life.

Hence, the significance of the Prophet Muhammad’s caution in the aforementioned tradition that “a man only receives what he intends (innama li-kulli imri’in ma nawa)”.

Without genuine knowledge as one’s moral cornerstone, even an insincere person, a hypocrite or religious enemy may pretend, or merely imitate, in their performance of external religious rituals.

Moreover, without true knowledge, actions that pertain to divine worship will be rendered null and void.

On the contrary, according to al-Tahanawi, such non-deliberative actions are considered mere custom (‘adat) and formality (resam), a habitual repetition which is void of sincerity but full of either satanic urge or personal vice and folly.

All in all, the obligation to pursue true knowledge (al-‘Ilm) upon each and every Muslim is inevitable, as knowledge is the most important integral of belief and faith.

In his commentary on a well-known hadith concerning the obligation to pursue knowledge for all Muslims, Murtada al-Zabidi (d. 1205/1790) explained that mankind is commanded by God to have belief and faith (al-Iman).

However, al-Zabidi pointed out that Iman in reality consists of two integrals.

There is certainty with regard to knowledge, or ‘ilm al-yaqin, of religious truths concerning unseen matters, i.e. of God, His messengers, His angels, His scriptures, and the Day of Judgment, as mentioned in, for example, al-Baqarah, (2): 3-4, 177, 285; and al-Nisa’, (4): 136.

Such an integrative vision of Islamic faith and sciences is utterly different from contemporary Western religious experience.

Muslim thought is totally in disagreement with prevalent Kierkegaardian philosophy, which propagates the idea that religious belief involves “direct opposition to all human reason”, nor with Freudian psychoanalysis, that “the content of religious beliefs is contradicted by the truth of scientific reason”, nor with Alfred Ayer’s argument that religio-theological statements are nonsensical and meaningless.

Furthermore, Iman also comprises action in conformity with one’s knowledge of religious truths, which is a practical verification accomplished in accordance with religious cognitive truths.

In other words, as al-Zabidi argued, subsequent to having faith in the Pillars of Belief (arkan al-Iman), to live one’s life along the path of Islam (shari‘ah) is obligatory upon every Muslim, whereas that is not possible unless and until knowledge of the true path has been acquired, including acts of worship directed solely towards God, fair socio-political practices directed toward fellow human beings, and moral virtues.

It is indeed impossible to conceive Iman shorn of epistemological and practical content.

Allah says in the Quran that He brought forth his servants from their mothers’ wombs when they knew nothing (al-Nahl, 16:78).

Hence the obvious implication to seek Knowledge to the best of one’s ability is obligatory upon each and every Muslim.